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FEDERAL ENFORCEMENT OF AIRLINE SYSTEM BOARD
AWARDS UNDER THE RAILWAY LABOR ACT: THE
SPECTER OF CHICAGO RIVER*
SECrION 184 of Title II of the Railway Labor Act requires that every col-
lective bargaining agreement in the airline industry provide for a system board.'
The purpose of requiring that system boards be established is to encourage the
peaceful settlement of disputes arising under existing collective bargaining
agreements between unions and the airlines.2 But section 184 does not on its
face reveal whether a suit to enforce an award of an airline system board can
be brought in a federal district court as an action arising under the laws of the
United States or an act of Congress regulating commerce.3 The Supreme Court
has granted certiorari in International Ass'n of Machinists v. Central Airlines,
Inc.4 to decide what appears to be a disarmingly narrow procedural question-
whether section 184 of Title II affords a federal right of enforcement for awards
of airline system boards.5 But, as with most questions that concern the absence
of clearly expressed congressional intent and a complex regulatory xcheme,
the question cannot be viewed so simply. For not only does the question in-
volve a construction of other provisions of the RLA, of which Title H is only
a part, but it also requires a consideration of the far reaching effects this de-
cision may have on other related questions, such as whether an airline union
may use self help in the form of a strike to enforce a system board award and
whether any federal standard of review applies in proceedings brought in state
courts or in federal courts under diversity jurisdiction to enforce these awards.
In Internationad Ass'n of Machinists v. Central Airlines, Inc.,0 a local air-
line adjustment board established pursuant to section 184 awarded six em-
ployees of the airline reinstatement and back pay. The company had discharged
*International Ass'n of Machinists v. Central Airlines, Inc., 295 F.2d 209 (5th Cir. 1961),
cert. granted, 369 U.S. 802 (1962).
1. Section 204, 49 Stat. 1189 (1936), 45 U.S.C. § 184 (1958) [hereinafter sometimes
cited as RLA].
2. See § 201, 49 Stat 1189 (1936), 45 U.S.C. § 181 (1958), which by its terms incor-
porates § 151(a) of title I of the RLA.
3. The wording of the section is:
It shall be the duty of every carrier and of its employees, acting through their
representatives,... to establish a board of adjustment of jurisdiction not exceeding
the jurisdiction; which may be lawfully exercised by system, group, or regional boards
of adjustment, under the authority of section 3, Title I, of this Act.
Such boards of adjustment may be established by agreement between employees
and carriers either on any individual carrier, or system, or group of carriers by air
and any class or classes of its or their employees; or pending the establishment of a
permanent National Board, of Adjustment as hereinafter provided.
Section 204, 49 Stat. 1189 (1936), 45 U.S.C. § 184 (1958).
4. 295 F.2d 209 (5th Cir. 1961), cert. granted, 369 U.S. 802 (1962).
5. Brief for Respondent, p. 2.
6. 295 F.2d 209, 211 (5th Cir. 1961), cert. granted, 369 U.S. 802 (1962),
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the men for refusing to work overtime and for not appearing at a hearing sub-
sequently held by the company.7 At this hearing the company had refused to
allow union representatives to accompany the employees; the adjustment board
ruled that this refusal resulted in an improper procedure for discharge and
thus was a breach of the collective bargaining agreement in force between the
parties.8 Although the collective agreement provided that the award of the
board was to be final and binding upon the parties,9 the company refused to
comply, claiming that the board had exceeded its jurisdiction and had not ade-
quately considered the merits of the case.10 The union sued for enforcement in
a federal district court, asserting as the basis for federal jurisdiction that the
act requiring the establishment of the adjustment boards also required that the
awards of the board be afforded finality as a matter of federal law.11 Thus a
suit to enforce an award of the board was a civil action that "arises under the
... laws ... of the United States"'1 2 or a "proceeding arising under any act
of Congress regulating commerce," as those terms are used in statutes con-
ferring original jurisdiction on federal district courts.' 3 By gaining a federal
forum, the union apparently believed it would obtain a more uniform and more
limited review of system board awards. The company, perhaps believing that
state courts would afford a greater scope of review to the award, moved to
dismiss on the ground that any right of enforcement was derived solely from
the terms of the contract between the parties and not from the act,14 since only
the contract between the parties stated that the awards of the board were to be
final and binding. The district court dismissed for want of jurisdiction and the
Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit affirmed on the ground that the fact that
federal law required the establishment of the system board was not by itself
sufficient to confer federal question jurisdiction on a federal court in a suit to
enforce awards of the board. 1
The Fifth Circuit, which ruled in Central Airlines that the finality of sys-
tem board awards was derived from the agreement between the parties so
that a suit on the award was not a sufficient basis for federal jurisdiction, had
7. Ibid.
8. Ibid.
9. Record on Certiorari, p. 8. Such clauses appear to be the general rule.
Every contract since 1936 covering the Air Line Pilots Association., which now has approxi-
mately 15,000 pilots as members, has included a provision making awards of a system
board final and binding. Brief for the ALPA as Amicus Curiae, p. 2. No case has been found
where an agreement establishing a system board has not provided that awards are to be
final and binding.
10. Record on Certiorari, p. 30.
11. Brief for Petitioners, p. 27.
12. International Ass'n of Machinists v. Central Airlines, Inc., 295 F.2d 209, 210 (5th
Cir. 1961), cert. granted, 369 U.S. 802 (1962).
13. See Judiciary Act of 1948, §§ 1331, 1337, 62 Stat. 930 (1948), 28 U.S.C. §§ 1331,
1337 (1958).
14. Record on, Certiorari, p. 29.
15. International As'n of Machinists v. Central Airlines, Inc., 295 F.2d 209, 218 (5th
Cir. 1961), cert. granted, 369 U.S. 802 (1962).
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previously viewed" the effect to be afforded a system board award as some-
thing more than a matter of contract between the union and the airline. The
appellate court in Sigfred v. Pan Am. World Airways, Inc.10 had held that the
finality of these awards was entitled to protection as a matter of federal law
and had established a federal standard of very limited review for system board
awards.17 In Sigfred a union member was suing, with jurisdiction based on
diversity of citizenship, to have an adverse award set aside. Since it was a
diversity case, it was alleged that state law providing for a broad standard of
review should apply1 8 In holding that a federal standard governed, the court
stated:
It becomes plain upon a moment's reflection that .. a [state] system of
review would completely sweep aside Congress's efforts to provide for a
prompt and orderly settlement of labor disputes by system boards of ad-
justment.' 9
Presumably this holding that a federal standard governs the review of system
board awards also applies to suits brought in state courts and thus assures pro-
tection to the awards against de novo or broad review in state courts. The
unions have nevertheless expressed dissatisfaction with the unavailability of
federal forums, save where diversity jurisdiction is present, for review of these
awards.20 This dissatisfaction stems from the fact that, even if the need for a
federal standard of limited review is recognized, enforcement suits, absent di-
versity jurisdiction, are governed by the variegated views of fifty state courts
as to what the federal standard for review is and how it should be applied.2 '
A union is especially at a disadvantage in such a situation. While it must wait
to see if the carrier will comply with the award before being able to sue for
enforcement, the carrier can choose the most favorable state forum available
in which to sue to set aside the award.2 2 It probably is this disuniformity,
allowing greater review by the state courts, that underlies the union's desire in
Central Airlines to establish that federal law confers finality on system board
awards so that a federal forum will be readily available for enforcement suits.
For a case to arise under the laws of the United States or an act regulating
commerce, the plaintiff must base his complaint on a substantial claim to a right
16. 230 F.2d 13 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 351 U.S. 925 (1956).
17. The majority stated that unless some question was raised concerning the system
board's jurisdiction or the regularity of its proceedings, there would be no review of the
board's rulings of law. Id. at 17.
18. Id. at 15.
19. Id. at 17.
20. Petition for Certiorari, p. 11, International Ass'n of Machinists v. Central Airlines,
Inc., 295 F.2d 209 (5th Cir. 1961), cert. granted, 369 U.S. 802 (1962).
21. For a discussion of the possibility for differing results in state courts see Mishkdn,
The Federal "Question?' in the District Courts, 53 CoLuar. L. REv. 157, 172 (1953).
22. The carrier in the instant case had filed suit in a state court to set aside the avard
prior to the union's suit to enforce the award. Petition for Certiorari, p. 11, n.2, International
Ass'n of Machinists v. Central Airlines, Inc., 295 F.2d 209 (5th Cir. 1961), cert. granted,
362 U.S. 802 (1962).
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granted by a federal statute.23 Because the interpretation of a federal statute is
frequently drawn in question in these cases, this requirement is often phrased
in terms that a plaintiff must succeed on one construction of the statute and
fail on another in order to establish "federal question" jurisdiction.2 4 This
characterization-"federal question" jurisdiction-and this phrasing of the re-
quirement are both confusing and misleading. For the question of jurisdiction
ultimately depends upon whether the plaintiff's suit is based upon a right
granted, whether explicitly or implicitly, by the federal statute, and not upon
whether the statute must be construed in order to determine if the plaintiff has
a federal right or not.25 Under this analysis, the court of appeal's statement in
Central Airlines that the existence of a board established pursuant to a fed-
eral statute is not determinative of whether a suit to enforce an award of the
board is based upon a federal right seems correct. If the union were suing to
23. E.g., Skelly Oil Co. v. Phillips Petroleum Co., 339 U.S. 667 (1950) ; Bell v. Hood,
327 U.S. 678 (1946).
24. E.g., Gulley v. First Natl Bank, 299 U.S. 109 (1936) ; Shulthis v. McDougal, 22.5
U.S. 561, 569 (1912). See generally 2 MOORE, FEDERAL PRAcTIcE fI 2.07 (2d ed. 1962) ; an-
notation to 28 U.S.C.A. § 1331 n.35 (1949).
25. See Mishkin, The Federal "Question" in the District Court, 53 CoLUM. L. REv.
157, 166, 170-71 (1953); London, "Federal Question" Jurisdiction-A Snare and a De-
lusion, 57 MICH. L. REv. 835 (1959). The cases cited in note 24 supra, taken literally,
would require a dispute over the existence of the federal right sought before there could
be federal question jurisdiction. This would mean that once a right is clearly established,
its existence no longer would be controverted so that a suit to enforce that right would not
be one arising under the laws of the United States.
It is very possible that this means there could be a federal right with no forum to en-
force it. While Testa v. Katt, 330 U.S. 386 (1947), held that state courts could not dls-
criminate against federal rights, Douglas v. New York, N.H. & H.R.R., 279 U.S. 377, 387
(1929), held that a state did not have to enforce a federal right if it did not enforce similar
state rights. State courts generally will not enforce any future agreement to arbitrate. See
generally STURGES, COMMERCIAL ARBITRATION AND AWARDs §§ 15, 18, 76-83 (1930). Texas,
the state in question here, follows this policy of non-enforcement. Tejas Development Co.
v. McGough Bros., 165 F.2d 276 (5th Cir. 1947).
Therefore state courts would not compel the establishment of the system boards. Yet,
since the right and duty to establish them is not subject to dispute, under the theory above
there would be no federal question jurisdiction for an enforcement suit. Since there was
also no diversity jurisdiction possible for the union in Central Airlincs, if the union had
needed to compel the establishment of the system board, there would have been no way to
effectuate the federal right.
Naturally the criteria for cases arising under the laws of the United States have not
been so limited. In Steele v. Louisville & N.R.R., 323 U.S. 192 (1944), the right to fair
representation under the RLA was clearly established. Tunstall v. Brotherhood, of Loc.
Eng'rs., 323 U.S. 210, 213 (1944), held that this right was sufficient to confer jurisdiction
upon federal courts for its enforcement. And, rather than subsequently denying jursdiction
federal courts have continued to allow federal jurisdiction in suits to enforce this clearly
established right. See, e.g., Hostetler v. Brotherhood of R.R. Trainmen, 287 F.2d 457, 458
(4th Cir. 1960), cert. denied, 368 U.S. 955 (1962) ; Richardson v. Texas & N.O.R.R., 242
F.2d 230, 234 (5th Cir. 1957) ; Hargrove v. Brotherhood of Locomotive Eng'rs., 116 F.
Supp. 3, 8 (D.D.C. 1953). Cf. American Well Works Co. v. Layne & Bowler Co., 241 U.S.
257 (1916).
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compel the company to cooperate in establishing a system board, as required by
section 184, the suit would dearly be one arising under the laws of the United
States or an act regulating commerce, since the union's claim would be square-
ly based upon the statute providing that "[i] t shall be the duty of every carrier
.. to establish a Board of Adjustment."20 However, though federal law re-
quires the establishment of the boards, so that an action based upon an award
of a board is indirectly derived from federal law, the question of whether a suit
to enforce the award "arises under" such law nevertheless depends on whether
the statute confers a federal right of enforcement for these awards. And this
question in turn depends upon whether section 184 makes system board awards
final and binding. When an award is final and binding, absent some constitu-
tional or procedural irregularity, a board's decision and order for relief is con-
clusive on the parties as to the merits of the controversy.- If the decision of
the system board is made final and binding on both parties as a matter of fed-
eral law, federal law imposes a duty on the parties to comply with the awards
of system boards and confers a corresponding right on a party to seek redress
for breach of the duty. Therefore a suit to enforce the award against a non-
complying party is based upon a right conferred by federal law.28 But if the
statute does not make the awards final and binding and thus afford a federal
right of enforcement, the actual basis for the suit is the collective agreement;
an action based on that agreement, even if it makes the awards final and bind-
ing, is not one arising under the laws of the United States or an act regulating
commerce.
Section 184 of Title II does not state whether airline system board awards
are to be final and binding,2 and the scant legislative history on this section
makes no mention of the effect to be given these awards.30 However, Title II
was added to the Railway Labor Act in 1936 to cover the small but expanding
airline industry on the theory that this transportation industry was sufficiently
similar to the railroads to require the same regulatory scheme governing labor-
management relations.3 ' At that time the railroads were governed by Title I of
the RLA, 2 and most of the provisions of Title I were incorporated by refer-
26. 49 Stat. 1189 (1936), 45 U.S.C. § 184 (1958).
27. See Sigfred v. Pan Am. World Airways, Inc., 230 F.2d 13, 16 (5th Cir.), cert.
denied, 351 U.S. 925 (1956) ; Brand v. Pennsylvania RR., 22 F. Supp. 569 (ElD. Pa. 1938);
Ellerd v. Southern Pac. R.R., 241 F2d 541 (7th Cir. 1957).
28. See note 25 supra and Graham v. Brotherhood of Loc. Firemen, 338 U.S. 232
(1949) ; Switchmerns Union v. National lied. Bd., 320 U.S. 297 (1943) ; Virginian Ry. v.
System Fed. #40, 300 U.S. 515 (1937) for ex-amples of federal courts enforcing rights
granted by the RLA.
29. See the wording of § 184, mspra note 3.
30. See Hearings on S. 2496 Before a Subcommittee of the Senate Comm ittee on In-
terstate Commerce, 74th Cong., 1st Sess. (1935).
31. Hearings on S. 2496 Before a Subcomnittee of the Senate Committec on Inter-
state Commerce, 74th Cong., 1st Sess. 4, 26-27 (1935). For an expression of dissatisfaction
with the subsequent results of the application of the RLA to airlines see Maclntyre, The
Railway Labor Act-A Misfit for the Airlines, 19 J. Am L. & Com. 274 (1952).
32. 48 Stat. 1185 (1934), 45 U.S.C. §§ 151-64 (1958), amending 44 Stat. 577 (1926).
1963]
-THE YALE LAW JOURNAL
ence into Title 11.83 Section 184 of Title II finds its counterpart in section 153
of Title I, which establishes the procedures governing the settlement of labor
disputes arising under collective agreements between rail carriers and unions.84
An examination of Title I and the events leading to the passage of section 153
furnishes a basis for deciding whether section 184 confers finality upon awards
of an airline system board, Such an examination will also shed light upon some
of the ripple effects a determination of the issue involved in the principal case
may have.
As originally passed in 1926, the Railway Labor Act stressed voluntary pro-
cedures for the settlement of labor disputes between railroads and unions.8
Thus, the act established a Federal Board of Mediation to propose solutions
on both disputes concerning the formation of a collective bargaining agreement
-major disputes-and those arising under an existing agreement-minor dis-
putes.38 It also allowed the parties to establish system boards to decide minor
disputes. 7 Where no system board had been established or where the system
board, composed of an equal number of representatives of the union and carrier,
was deadlocked, the dispute was to be referred to the Board of Mediation,
whose resolution was not binding 8 After eight years the Board of Mediation
had become inundated because of the ineffectiveness of this wholly voluntary
procedure.3 9 The carriers had often refused to establish system boards; the few
boards that were established had no means of breaking the deadlocks that com-
monly occurred.40 The act was amended in 1934 to provide a more effective
procedure for the peaceful resolution of minor disputes. Instead of providing
for the mandatory establishment of system boards, the act required that a na-
tional adjustment board, composed of an equal number of representatives from
unions and carriers, be established.4 1 Deadlocks on this National Railroad Ad-
33. 49 Stat. 1189 (1936), 45 U.S.C. §§ 181-82 (1958).
34. 48 Stat. 1189 (1934), 45 U.S.C. § 153 First (1958).
35. 44 Stat. 578 (1926). For a complete collection and discussion of railway labor legis-
lation prior to 1926 see U.S. ATTORNEY GENERAL'S COMMITTEE ON ADMINISTRATIVE PRO-
CEDURE, INQUIRY RELATING TO THE NATIONAL RAILROAD ADJUSTMENT BOARD: BOOK II
(1941).
36. Section 5, 44 Stat. 580-82 (1926). The terms "major" and "minor," while not con-
tained in the statute, have been used, to describe the two classes of disputes. See, e.g., Elgin,
J. & E. Ry. v. Burley, 325 U.S. 711, 723 (1945). For a recent exploration of the problems
created by this division see McGuinn, Injunctive Powers of the Federal Courts In Cases
Involving Disputes Under The Railway Labor Act, 50 GEo. L.J. 46 (1961).
37. Section 3 First, 44 Stat. 578-79 (1926).
38. Section 5 First, 44 Stat. 580 (1926).
39. Elgin, J. & E. Ry. v. Burley, 325 U.S. 711, 725-26 (1945).
40. Hearings on S. 3266 Before the Senate Committee on Interstate Commerce, 73d
Cong., 2d Sess. 15-17 (1934).
41. 48 Stat. 1189 (1934), 45 U.S.C. § 153 First (1958). The NRAB is broken down
into four divisions operating independently of each other. The divisions are for varlous
classes of employees. 48 Stat. 1190-91 (1934), 45 U.S.C. § 153 First (h) (1958). The
national character of the Board was primarily the demand of the unions who believed that
their interests would be better protected by a national body. The carriers agreed that com-
pulsory boards ought to be established, but wanted them on a local basis so as to be better
[Vol. 72: 803
AIRLINE SYSTEM BOARD AWARDS
justment Board (NRAB) were avoided by provisions for the appointment of
a neutral referee when needed.4 2 Although the Board's jurisdiction was optional
in the sense that a dispute did not have to be submitted to it,4a3 when either
party submitted a dispute, the other was compelled to appear and was bound
by the award of the Board.44 In addition, there was a provision in the act al-
lowing the parties to agree upon the establishment of a system board,4 which
would exempt them from the jurisdiction of the NRAB.4 t If either party sub-
sequently objected to the operation of such a system board, however, he could
again come under the jurisdiction of the NRAB by simply giving a ninety-day
notice of such an intention. 47
The establishment of the NRAB by section 153 First of the RLA was en-
visaged by Congress as representing a procedure for the compulsory arbitra-
tion of minor disputes.48 In keeping with the nature of effective arbitration,
the awards of the NRAB were made final and binding upon the parties to the
dispute by subsection (m).49 This subsection thus imposes a duty of compliance
upon the parties and therefore provides a basis for federal jurisdiction in a suit
to enforce an NRAB award.50 However, Congress was more explicit on the
able to handle local problems. Garrison, The National Railroad Adjustment Board: A
Unique Administrative Agency, 46 YAIX L.J. 567, 574-75 (1937). As a compromise to the
carriers, it was provided that, if agreement could be reached, the NRAB would establish
regional boards. 48 Stat. 1193 (1934), 45 U.S.C. § 153 First (w) (1958).
42. 48 Stat. 1191 (1934), 45 U.S.C. § 153 First (1) (1958).
43. The wording of the act is that "the disputes may be referred by petition of the
parties. .. " 48 Stat. 1191 (1934), 45 U.S.C. § 153 First (i) (1958). However, the Su-
preme Court in 1950 held that the NRAB has exclusive jurisdiction over disputes involving
the interpretation or application of collective bargaining agreements except in the limited
area of suits for wrongful discharge. Slocum v. Delaware, L. & W.R.R., 339 U.S. 239
(1950). Then in 1957, a union 's strike over a minor grievance was enjoined. Brotherhood
of R.R. Trainmen v. Chicago R. & I.R.R., 353 U.S. 30 (1957). The result is that the parties
may have no alternative to adjustment by the NRAB.
44. Since subsection (m) of § 153 First makes awards final and binding, the second
party to the dispute has to appear to protect his interests. 48 Stat. 1191 (1934), 45 U.S.C.
§ 153, First (m) (1958).
45. 48 Stat. 1193 (1934), 45 U.S.C. § 153 Second (1958).
46. Atlantic Coast Line R.R. v. Pope, 119 F.2d 39 (4th Cir. 1941); Hearings on S.
3266, supra note 40, at 34; H. R. REP. No. 1944, 73d Cong., 2d Sess. 3-4 (1934).
47. 48 Stat. 1193 (1934), 45 U.S.C. § 153 Second (1958).
48. Brotherhood of R.R. Trainmen v. Chicago River & I.R.R., 353 U.S. 30,39 (1957);
Hearings on HR. 7650 Before the House Conmnittee on Interstate and Fordgn Comnmcrce,
73d Cong., 2d Sess. 58 (1934).
49. 48 Stat. 1191 (1934), 45 U.S.C. § 153 First (m) (1958) ; Union Pac. R.R. v. Price,
360 U.S. 601, 616 (1959). The great need for finality is also discussed in Gregory & Or-
likoff, The Enforcement of Labor Arbitration Agreements, 17 U. CuL L REv. 233, 238
(1950). Compare the Supreme Court's recognition of the importance of arbitration agree-
ments and the need to give binding effect to resulting awards in the "Steelworkers Trilogy,"
United Steelworkers of America v. American Mfg. Co., 363 U.S. 564 (1960); United
Steelworkers of America v. Warrior and Gulf Nay. Co., 363 U.S. 574 (1960); United
Steelworkers of America v. Enterprise Wheel and Car Corp., 363 U.S. 593 (1960).
50. See notes 23-28 sitpra and accompanying text.
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question of federal jurisdiction. Section 153 First goes on to state in subsec-
tion (p) that when a carrier refuses to comply with an award, the union may
bring an enforcement suit in a federal court, and in this suit, the Board's award
is to serve as printa facie evidence for the union."1 While clearly establishing
federal jurisdiction for suits brought by the union, this subsection also grants
a much broader scope of review than would otherwise be available and there-
fore undercuts the finality afforded NRAB awards by subsection (m).5" What-
ever the reason for the inconsistency between subsections (m) and (p),53 since
federal courts give only limited review when the unions lose," the effect of
these two provisions is that there is limited judicial review when a union loses
and broad review when it prevails before the Board. Because the enforcement
procedure of subsection (p) places a burden upon the unions to litigate their
claims twice, unions generally do not sue for enforcement of NPRAB awards.
Instead they strike, either before submitting the dispute to the Board or after
receiving an award from it.5 Carriers have not sought to enforce awards of the
51. 48 Stat. 1192 (1934), 45 U.S.C. § 153 First (p) (1958). To make it easier for
employees and unions to bring their suits, this section also provides that the petitioner shall
not be liable for costs in any event and shall receive, if successful, reasonable attorney's fees,
52. For statements to this effect see Pennsylvania R.R. v. Day, 360 U.S. 548, 558-59
(1959) (dissenting opinion) ; Dahlberg v. Pittsburg & L.E.R.R., 138 F.2d 121 (3d Cir.
1943) ; Northrup & Kahn, Railroad Grievance Machinery: A Critical Analyss-II, 5 INt.
& LAD. REL. REv. 540 (1952). The limited grounds for review of common law arbitration
awards is discussed in STURGES, COMMERCIAL ARBITRATIONS AND AWARDS §§ 366-68 (1930).
For cases where a federal court, in an enforcement proceeding, has reversed ar adjustment
board award see Dahlberg v. Pittsburg & L.E.R.R., supra; Brotherhood of Ry. & S.S.
Clerks v. Railway Express Agency, 238 F.2d 181 (6th Cir. 1956). It should be noted,
though, that in most cases the carriers willingly comply with adverse awards. BRAUN,
LABOR DISPUTES AND THEIR SETTELEMENT 185 (1955) ; SPENCER, THE NATIONAL RAILROAD
ADJUSTMENT BOARD 56 (1938).
53. While the existence of subsection (p) might be explained as an effort to guarantee
federal courts jurisdiction, see Kroner, Minor Disputes Under the Railway Labor Act: A
Critical Appraisal, 37 N.Y.U.L. REv. 41, 71 (1962), this would appear unnecessary in light
of the broad grant of jurisdiction granted by 28 U.S.C. § 1337 and would not explain why
the awards were only to be prima facie evidence. In § 159 of the RLA, for example, arbi-
tration awards resulting from agreements by parties to arbitrate disputes over the forma-
tion of contract provisions are conclusive on the parties as to the merits and facts of the
controversy. 44 Stat. 585 (1926), 45 U.S.C. § 159 Second (1958).
54. See, e.g., Ellerd v. Southern Pac. R.R., 241 F.2d 541 (7th Cir. 1957) ; Brand v.
Pennsylvania R.R., 22 F. Supp. 569 (E.D. Pa. 1938). Subsection (in) states that noney
awards are not to be final and binding, but the Supreme Court has recently affirmed that
a denial of an employee's money claim is not a "money award" within the terms of the
act so that the denial is final and binding. Union Pac. R.R. v. Price, 360 U.S. 601, 608
(1959). And the federal courts have treated grants of money awards in enforcement suits
similarly to non-money awards so that the wording appears useless. See Brotherhood of
R.R. Trainmen v. Chicago River & I.R.R., 353 U.S. 30, 32 (1957) ; Brotherhood of R.R.
Trainmen v. Denver & R.G.W.R.R., 290 F.2d 266, 267 (10th Cir. 1961), cert. denied, 366
U.S. 966 (1961), amicus brief filed and rehearing denied, 368 U.S. 873 (1961).
55. SPENCER, THE NATIONAL RAILROAD ADJUSTMENT BOARD 56 (1938); Hearings on
S. 3463 Before a Subcommittee of the Senate Committee on Labor and Public Welfare,
81st Cong., 2d Sess. 76-77, 88, 299 (1950) ; BRAUN, LABOR DISPUTES AND ThEIR S'rTL-
MENT 221 (1955).
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Board, primarily because the nature of minor grievances are such that an
"award" for the carrier will generally be in the form of denying an affirmative
union claim.
56
The use of strikes by unions has not gone unnoticed. In 1950 a bill was pro-
posed prohibiting strikes over disputes under the RLA, granting limited judi-
cial review to all affected by an NRAB award whether favorably or adversely,
and establishing compulsory arbitration of major disputes. 7 The bill was de-
feated because of the provision for compulsory arbitration. s Then in 1957 the
Supreme Court held, in Brotherhood of R.R. Trainmen v. Chicago River &
I.R.R.," that since Congress had provided an exclusive administrative remedy
for the settlement of minor disputes under the RLA, a union could be enjoined
from striking over a pending dispute that had been submitted by a carrier to
the NRAB. 6 0 The Court did not pass on the question of whether a strike to
enforce an award of the NRAB could similarly be enjoined. Two circuit courts,
however, have extended the doctrine of Chicago River to such strikes on the
ground that the judicial procedure provided in the RLA is the exclusive means
for enforcing awards of the NRAB and that strikes in lieu of resolution of dis-
putes by the NRAB or of judicial enforcement of NRAB awards are incon-
sistent with the system of compulsory arbitration provided in section 153 First.
This extension of Chicago River to enforcement strikes is now before the
Supreme Court in the case of Louisville & N.R.R. v. Brotherhood of Loc.
Eng'rs.61 The result for railroad unions, if it is upheld, is that the procedure of
subsection (p), which formerly was only an alternative means of enforcement
whose inequities were not worth attacking, will now be the sole method of
enforcement available.
6 2
The strike weapon is especially effective under the RLA because once a strike is
threatened, the NMB can make a finding that a labor emergency exists and enter the dis-
pute to press for settlement. 49 Stat. 1189 (1936), 45 U.S.C. § 183 (1958) ; see SP.-Cc.,
supra at 56. Since an award on the merits has already been issued in favor of the union,
the carrier is at a distinct disadvantage in this non-judicial proceeding. Northrup & Kahn,
supra note 52, at 541.
56. Since the carrier determines the status quo under the collective bargaining agree-
ment by determining seniority rights, work rules, or rates of pay according to its inter-
pretation of the agreement, the union will be the party seeking a different interpretation
of the contract if there is a disagreement.
57. S. 3463, 81st Cong., 2d Sess. (1950).
58. See generally Hearings on S. 3463, supra note 55; S. REP. No. 2445, 81st Cong.,
2d Sess. (1950) (unfavorable).
59. 353 U.S. 30 (1957).
60. For the subsequent history of this doctrine and the problems it has caused see
Kroner, Minor Disputes Under the Railway Labor Act: A Critical Appraisal, 37 N.Y.U.L
Rxv. 41 (1962) ; McGuinn Injunctive Powers of the Federal Courts in Cases Invoking
Disputes Under the Railway Labor Act, 50 Gao. L.J. 46 (1961).
61. 190 F. Supp. 829 (W.D. Ky.), aff'd per curiam, 297 F.2d 603 (6th Cir. 1961), cert.
granted, 370 U.S. 908 (1962). The other case was Brotherhood of R.R. Trainmen v. Deaver
& R.G.W.R., 290 F.2d 266 (10th Cir.), cert. denied, 366 U.S. 966, amicus brief filed and
rehearing denied, 368 U.S. 873 (1961).
62. The existence of a detailed enforcement procedure would appear to be as "exclusive"
as the administrative remedy that was the basis for Chicago River. However, if the under-
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In contrast to the detailed procedure in section 153 First, section 153 Sec-
ond, which allows the parties to agree upon the establishment of system boards
to decide minor disputes in lieu of the NRAB, is silent on the legal effect of
awards rendered by these boards. 68 What little legislative history there is for
section 153 Second indicates that the parties were to be given the right to de-
cide whether or not these awards were to be final and binding.0 4 This choice
by the parties, coupled with the fact that the existence of a system board
exempts the NRAB from jurisdiction, leads to the result that the parties
through agreement can avoid whatever finality is afforded by section 153 First.
Thus the policy of compulsory arbitration which appears to be embodied in
section 153 First seems undermined. But it should not be overlooked that
either party can reinstate the NRAB's jurisdiction and thus the finality of
section 153 First by giving notice to the other party of its intention to do so.00
Therefore, if one side should refuse to comply with a system board award
on the ground that it was not made final by agreement, the other could then
dissolve the system board and return to the NRAB.
The broad purpose of Title II of the RLA was to bring labor-management
relations in the airline industry under the same pattern of regulation as had
been applied to the railroads under Title 1.00 Moreover, the alterations in Title
II before its passage indicate that it was based upon the procedures of sections
153 First and Second governing minor disputes in the railroad industry. The
initial structure of Title II basically followed the design established by the 1934
amendments to the RLA. There was to be a national air transport adjustment
board similar to the NRAB and the parties were to be allowed to establish sys-
tem boards as a substitute for the jurisdiction of the national board. The awards
of the national air board were to be final and binding on the parties and the
same enforcement procedures provided in section 153 First were to be used.07
But the establishment of the national airline board was postponed because of
the small size of the industry in 1936 ;08 a provision giving the National Media-
tion Board the power to create the National Air Transport Adjustment Board
when the NMB deems it appropriate was incorporated in Title 11.09 In the
lying premise of Chicago River was that the merits of a dispute were not to be decided by
economic force, see Sinclair Ref. Co. v. Atkinson, 370 U.S. 195, 205-11 (1962), once m
award is made there is no such danger. Against this argument for denying an injunction
in the Louisville & Nashville case is the overriding goal of the RLA for the peaceful settle-
ment of disputes. Also, a union enforcement strike denies a carrier the judicial review
accompanying an enforcement suit so that economic force is still being used to decide the
merits of the dispute.
63. 48 Stat. 1193 (1934), 45 U.S.C. § 153 Second (1958).
64. Hearings on S. 3266, supra note 40, at 34; Hearings on, H.R. 7650, supra note 48,
at 88-89.
65. 48 Stat. 1193 (1934), 45 U.S.C. § 153 Second (1958).
66. See note 31 supra.
67. S. 2496, 74th Cong., 1st Sess. (1935).
68. Hearings on S. 2496, supra note 31, at 4; H.R. REP. No. 2245, 74th Cong., 2d Scs.
1 (1935).
69. 49 Stat. 1189 (1936), 45 U.S.C. § 185 (1958).
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interval, the NMB was to have jurisdiction over all airline disputes 70 with the
parties being able to establish system boards if they so desired.7 ' Because of the
experience with this voluntary procedure under the RLA prior to the passage
of sections 153 First and Second in 1934,72 however, the bill was amended to
provide for a less voluntary procedure for the settlement of minor disputes.
Rather than compelling the establishment of the national adjustment board
according to the 1934 pattern, though, a variation was adopted that required
the establishment of the system boards, at least pending the establishment of
the NATAB by the NMB. 73
It is through this variation in section 184 of the procedures of section 153
that Congress tried to assure that labor disputes in the airline industry would
be resolved in a manner similar to the resolution of disputes in the railroad
industry.74 Unfortunately, Congress did not state whether this similar treat-
ment was to be achieved by equating the awards of the airline system boards
with those of the NRAB or with those of the voluntarily established railroad
system boards. If the former, the awards should be entitled to the weight given
those of the NRAB by federal law; if the latter, whatever weight they have
will be derived only from the contract between the parties establishing the
system boards. Arguably the procedures of section 184 can be equated with
the railroad system boards of section 153 Second, since the definition of the
jurisdiction of air system boards is put in terms of "not exceeding the juris-
diction which may be lawfully exercised by system, group, or regional boards
of adjustment, under the authority of Section 3, Title I, of this act" ;g7 the ad-
justment boards referred to are the boards which may be voluntarily estab-
lished by parties under section 153 Second. However, equating the airline
boards with the railroad system boards will not assure a similar procedure for
the resolution of minor disputes. While section 153 Second leaves the question
of finality to be determined by the parties,7 6 if one of the parties is dissatisfied
with system board awards because they lack finality, he has the choice of mov-
ing from the jurisdiction of the system board to the jurisdiction of the NRAB
whose awards are final and binding7 However, parties to the awards of air-
line system boards have no such alternative, for there is no national board in
70. Hearings on S. 2496, supra note 31, at 3.
71. S. 2496, 74th Cong., 1st Sess. (1935).
72. Hearings on S. 2496, supra note 31, at 11.
73. 49 Stat. 1189 (1936), 45 U.S.C. § 184 (1958).
74. Hearings on S. 2496, supra note 31, at 12.
75. 49 Stat. 1189 (1936), 45 U.S.C. § 184 (1958). The use of the words "not exceed-
ig" was unfortunate as it implies that the boards could have less jurisdiction. If this were
so, the policy of the act of providing adjustment boards for the settlement of disputes would
be defeated since parties could establish boards with no jurisdiction, Therefore, in light of
the use of the same wording in § 185 in. reference to the NATAB which is recognized as
being equivalent to the NRAB, see Metcalf v. National Airlines, Inc., 271 F.Zd 817 (5th Cir.
1959), the words should be interpreted as meaning "the same and no more than the same."
76. See note 64 supra.
77. 48 Stat. 1193 (1934), 45 U.S.C. § 153 Second (1958).
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existence whose jurisdiction can be invoked. In the absence of an air national
board equivalent to the NRAB, the air system boards are the sole means by
which to effectuate the peaceful settlement of minor disputes, not an alternative
method to be voluntarily selected by parties. For this reason it would seem
that the procedures of section 184 are far more equivalent to those of 153 First
than to those of 153 Second.7s In addition, the establishment of both the
NRAB and the air system boards is compelled by federal law in an effort to
provide for the peaceful settlement of disputes. The compulsory establishment
of the air system boards was an effort to fill the gap left by the delayed estab-
lishment of the NATAB which, by the terms of Title II, was to afford adjust-
ment board awards the same weight and enforcement procedures as those out-
lined for the NRAB. This gap will not be filled and there will not be a similar
resolution of minor disputes in the airline and railroad industries if the awards
of the required air adjustment boards are not given the same weight or pro-
vided with the same enforcement procedure as the awards of the required rail-
road adjustment board, the NRAB.
Finding that the procedures of section 184 should be equated with those of
section 153 First in order to insure the similar treatment of grievances in the
airline and railroad industries would mean that the awards of air system boards
are to be afforded the same weight as those of the NRAB. The incorporation
of subsection (m) of section 153 First into section 184 would thus confer final-
ity on the awards of air system boards and federal jurisdiction would therefore
be established for suits to enforce these awards. But such a finding would also
undermine the finality of awards sought to be enforced by the unions. For
78. For statements that the procedures of the NRAB are to be applied to § 184 see
Bates v. Northwest Airlines, Inc., 171 F. Supp. 273, 274 (D. Minn. 1959) ; U.A.W. v. Delta
Airlines, Inc., 83 F. Supp. 63 (N.D. Ga. 1949). But see Metcalf v. National Airlines, Inc,
271 F.2d 817 (5th Cir. 1959).
For every method of statutory construction there is a countervailing method for reach-
ing the opposite conclusion. This has been illustrated in, detail by LLEWVLLYXr, Tnr Com-
mox LAW TRADImON-DEcwiDNG APPEALS 522-35 (1960). So, here, the comparison of the
explicit clauses of § 153 First with the silent § 184 can prove that Congress intended to
imply a right in § 184 or that Congress meant to reject that right in § 184. In light of the
specific attempt to equate the two sections, however, the former construction should apply.
The courts have also surrounded the NRAB and the compulsory system boards of § 184
with the same safeguards. The boards are given exclusive jurisdiction over the interpre-
tation of collective bargaining agreements. Compare Slocum v. Delaware, L. & W.R.Th,
339 U.S. 239 (1950), with Crusen v. United Air Lines, 141 F. Supp. 347 (D. Colo.), aff'd
per curam, 239 F.2d 863 (10th Cir. 1956). Limited review of adjustment board procedures
will be given for losing unions. Compare Ellerd v. Southern Pac. R.R., 241 F.2d 541 (7th
Cir. 1957), with Edwards v. Capital Airlines, Inc., 176 F.2d 755, 761 (D.C. Cir.), cert.
denied, 338 U.S. 885 (1949). The distinction in major and minor disputes is applied. Com-
pare Elgin, J. & E. Ry. v. Burley, 325 U.S. 711, 722-28 (1945), with O'Donnell v. Pan Am.
World Airways, Inc., 200 F.2d 929 (2d, Cir. 1953). The jurisdiction of the boards will be
protected by enjoining strikes over minor disputes. Compare Brotherhood of R.R. Train-
men v. Chicago River & I.R.R., 353 U.S. 30 (1957), with International Ass'n of Machinistg
v. Northwest Airlines, Inc., 304 F.2d 206 (8th Cir. 1962), and Northwest Airlines, Inc. v.
International Ass'n of Machinists, 179 F. Supp. 825 (D. Minn. 1959).
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similarity of treatment can only be achieved by the incorporation into section
184 of not only subsection (m) but also subsection (p), which undercuts the
finality of subsection (m) by providing for broad review in enforcement suits
by unions. If subsection (p) is not carried over, the scope of review of air sys-
tem board awards will differ substantially from those of the NRAB, since there
will be only limited review of air system board awards. Also, if the National
Air Transport Adjustment Board is later established,79 the same difference in
scope of review will exist between its awards and those of the system boards,
since the section providing for the establishment of the NATAB makes clear
that its awards are to be enforced in the same manner as those of the NRAB.8 0
These resulting dissimilarities would give pause to a court attempting to ex-
clude the provisions of subsection (p) from the federal right of finality in sec-
tion 184.
The broad standard of review required by subsection (p) for awards favor-
able to the unions is one of the unforeseen adverse effects on airline unions that
a victory for the union in Central Airlines may entail. The unions are seeking
a federal right of enforcement to avoid the broad and variegated state standards
of review, but the incorporation of subsection (p) into section 184 would mean
that a standard of review as broad as that of any state, short of a complete trial
de novo, would be applied to union enforcement suits. Moreover, the finality
denied by subsection (p) has been the primary reason for resort to enforcement
strikes by unions in the railroad industry."' But a reversal of the Fifth Circuit
in Central Airlines and a finding of a federal right of enforcement might de-
prive airline unions of this principal means used to date to gain compliance
with system board awards. If the Supreme Court in the Louisville & Nash-
ville 8 case approves the extension of the doctrine of Chicago River for rail-
roads so as to allow injunctions against enforcement strikes on the theory that
the enforcement procedure provided by section 153 First is exclusive, the find-
ing of a federal right of enforcement in section 184 will similarly render en-
forcement strikes by airline unions subject to injunctions. In short, a victory
for the union in Central Airlines may mean that airline unions are to be saddled
79. The possibilities for the establishment of the NATAB are slight, since the NRAB
is now anything but a rousing success. Disputes may take from five to seven years to settle.
See In re Hudson & .PLR., 178 F. Supp. 106 (S.D.N.Y. 1959) (letter from Executive
Secretary of the NRAB), cert. denied, 361 U.S. 928 (1960) ; Northrup & Kahn, supra
note 52, at 556. In light of this situation one district court judge even held that he would
give a carrier an injunction against a union strike over a minor dispute only if the carrier
and union promised not to send the grievance to the NRAB but instead to submit it to a
special adjustment board then in existence. Chicago, If. St. P. & P.R.R. v. Brotherhood of
R.. Trainmen, 42 C.C.H. Lab. Cas. 1 16,918 (E.D. Wis. 1961). Therefore, no one has
urged the adoption of a national air board. See Comment, 51 Nw. U.L. Rsv. 596, 597 (1956).
80. The wording is that the "awards [shall be] made, stated, served and enforced...
in the same manner and to the same extent as provided with reference to the National Rail-
road Adjustment Board by section 3 of Title I of this act." 49 Stat. 1189 (1936), 45 U.S.C.
§ 185 (1958).
81. See Hearings on S. 3463, supra note 55, at 205, 302.
82. See notes 61-62 supra and accompanying text.
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with the internal inconsistency of the interreaction of subsections (m) and (p),
while being denied the only alternative method of enforcement, the right to
strike.
Conversely, if the Supreme Court affirms the Fifth Circuit's literal reading
of section 184-that federal law compels only the establishment of system
boards and does not render their awards final and binding as a matter of fed-
eral law-it is possible that no injunctions will be allowed against strikes by
airline unions over minor grievances. Indeed, the extension of Chicago River
to airline union strikes over disputes pending before an air system board 83
would be questionable, since the basis of the decision in Chicago River was that
Congress had provided an exclusive and binding administrative remedy for the
settlement of minor disputes8 4 For the airlines, the settlement would not be
binding as a matter of federal law. A court might still hold that, binding or
not, the process of adjustment provided by the compulsory establishment of
system boards is exclusive and this fact, combined with the policy expressed
in the act for the peaceful settlement of disputes, requires that airline unions
be enjoined from striking over pending disputes. But even if these strike in-
junctions are allowed, once an adjustment board decision is given, if the awards
are not final and binding as a matter of federal law, there will be no exclusive
peaceful means of enforcement provided by the act. Therefore, the basis for
enjoining the enforcement strike would not be present. Thus, an affirmance of
the Fifth Circuit on the ground that awards of air system boards are not final
and binding by virtue of federal law would probably leave the airline unions in
possession of their most powerful enforcement weapon, the strike, and would
seem to leave the unions with as satisfactory a standard of review in state courts
as they would get by virtue of section 153 First (p).
Indeed, though a right of federal enforcement would be denied the airline
unions by an affirmance of the Fifth Circuit, under the federal standard im-
posed by that court in Sigfred v. Pan American World Airways, Inc.85 the
unions would face a far more limited standard of review for favorable awards
than would be afforded by the inclusion in section 184 of subsection (p). But
a finding that it is not federal law but only the terms of the contract between
the parties that makes the awards of air system boards final and binding casts
doubt upon the validity of the Fifth Circuit's holding in Sigfred and thus the
continued applicability of a limited federal standard of review to airline system
board awards, either in state courts or federal courts sitting under diversity
jurisdiction. For it is difficult to see how federal law makes the awards final
and binding for the purpose of judicial review and not final and binding for
the purpose of federal jurisdiction. And, if the effect to be afforded the awards
is solely a matter of contract between the parties, as a denial of finality con-
ferred by section 184 would imply, there would appear to be no basis in the
83. Northwest Airlines, Inc. v. International Ass'n of Machinists, 178 F. Supp. 825
(D. Minn. 1959).
84. See note 60 mpra.
85. See notes 16-19 supra and accompanying text.
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Railway Labor Act for establishing a federal standard to govern review. If
there is no federal law upon which to base a federal standard of review, vary-
ing state laws of review will govern suits to enforce awards of air system
boards.8 6 As a result, the problem earlier referred to of the varying state inter-
pretations of the federal standard of review wil be replaced by the more dis-
turbing problem of the- states imposing their own standards of review. This
will grant the carriers an even greater possibility of finding a court that will be
likely to set aside a particular award.
Thus, the airline unions have little to gain and perhaps much to lose from
either a decision granting a federal forum for the enforcement of air system
board awards but imposing the broad review of subsection (p), or a decision
holding that whatever weight is to be given to system board awards is to be a
result only of the terms of the particular contract between the parties. Nor will
either decision further the goal of encouraging the prompt, orderly, and peace-
ful settlement of labor-management disputes. Denying any weight to system
board awards will both encourage and allow enforcement strikes, while grant-
ing federal enforcement with broad review will require the union virtually to
relitigate all favorable awards and will impose on federal courts a correspond-
ing burden of resolving these disputes. These resolutions will be neither peace-
ful nor prompt. The most desirable solution would be one that assured greater
uniformity in the standards governing the enforcement of adjustment board
awards in the interstate airline industry by granting federal jurisdiction, that
assured the effectiveness of the system board process by granting limited judi-
cial review, and that assured the peaceful settlement of disputes by enjoining
strikes used either to resolve minor disputes or to enforce system board awards.
This result can be reached by reversing the Fifth Circuit in Central Airlincs on
the ground that subsection (m)-and only subsection (m)-is to be incorpo-
rated in section 184. Another possible ground for reaching this result is to ignore
the intended similar treatment of disputes in the airline and railroad indus-
tries and view section 184 in isolation from the procedures of section 153 First.
Then it may reasonably be concluded that since federal law compels the estab-
lishment of airline system boards to settle disputes effectively and peacefully,
the effectuation of this policy requires that federal courts guarantee the finality
of the awards of air system boards.8 7 The problem with either rationale is that
86. For a discussion of the varying standards applied by states see Note, .udicial Re-
view of Arbitration Awards on the Merits, 63 HARv. L. REv. 681 (1950) ; Carb, The Need
for Uniform Laws of Arbitration, 15 Bus. LAw 37 (1959). Also see e.x-amples cited in Brief
for Petitioner, pp. 28-29, International Ass'r of Machinists v. Central Airlines, Inc., 295
F.2d 209 (5th Cir. 1961), cert. granted, 369 U.S. 802 (1962).
87. The Fifth Circuit in Sigfred stated:
Congress having required the negotiation of collective bargaining agreements, and
the establishment of boards of adjustment to interpret them, we deem it a reasonable
corollary thereto that it intended that the scope of review in appeals from those
boards should be determined by federal courts applying federal law.
Sigfred v. Pan Am. World Airways, Inc., 230 F.2d 13, 16 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 351 U.S.
925 (1956). Also compare a similar judicial "interpretation" by the Supreme Court in
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Congress in 1936 appeared to envisage an adjustment procedure for airlines
similar to, and not more effective than, that already provided for the railroads.
But, if awards of the NRAB-and, if established, the NATAB-are to be en-
titled to only prima facie weight, dissimilar procedures will be provided when
air system board awards are made final and binding in union enforcement suits.
Thus, it should be recognized that if the Court is to reach the most desirable
solution, it will, in effect, be writing the RLA for airlines as it originally should
have been written for both the railroads and the airlines. However this ques-
tion is resolved, it is clear that the effects of a determination of this proce-
dural question may be far greater than anyone realized when the union in
Central Airlines decided to seek a federal forum for enforcement of an airline
system board award.
Textile Workers v. Lincolry Mills, 353 U.S. 448 (1957). For a lengthy criticism of this
particular action see Bickel & Wellington, Legislative Purpose and the judicial Process:
The Lincoln Mills Case, 71 HARv. L. Rnv. 1 (1957).
